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The ability to identify and react to novelty within the environment is fundamental to survival. Computational models
emphasize the potential role of the hippocampus in novelty detection, its unique anatomical circuitry making it ideally
suited to act as a comparator between past and present experience. The hippocampus, therefore, is viewed to detect
associative mismatches between what is expected based on retrieval of past experience and current sensory input.
However, direct evidence that the human hippocampus performs such operations is lacking. We explored brain
responses to novel sequences of objects using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), while subjects
performed an incidental target detection task. Our results demonstrate that hippocampal activation was maximal
when prior predictions concerning which object would appear next in a sequence were violated by sensory reality. In
so doing, we establish the biological reality of associative match-mismatch computations within the human
hippocampus, a process widely held to play a cardinal role in novelty detection. Our results also suggest that the
hippocampus may generate predictions about how future events will unfold, and critically detect when these
expectancies are violated, even when task demands do not require it. The present study also offers broader insights
into the nature of essential computations carried out by the hippocampus, which may also underpin its unique
contribution to episodic memory.
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Introduction
We have all had the experience of walking into a familiar
place, for example our living room, and immediately noticing
that a new object such as a painting is present (i.e., stimulus
novelty), or equally that the furniture has been rearranged
(i.e., associative novelty). Whereas the neural mechanisms
underlying the coding of stimulus novelty have been widely
studied [1,2], surprisingly little is understood about the way in
which associative novelty is represented within the human
brain.
How might the brain enable us to rapidly and apparently
effortlessly detect such unexpected occurrences, when famil-
iar objects appear in new conﬁgurations (i.e., associative
novelty)? One attractive possibility suggested by theoretical
models is that novelty detection relies upon a comparison
between current sensory input and stored representations [3–
9]. This computation has been proposed to occur in the
hippocampus, given the unique nature of its anatomical
circuitry [3–5,10,11]. The hippocampus, therefore, is viewed
to detect ‘‘associative mismatches’’ in the environment, i.e.,
when current sensory input conﬂicts with expectations
deriving from associative retrieval of past experience [3–
5,10–12]. By this account, we only notice that our favourite
armchair has moved because we have expectations, derived
from prior experience, about where it should be located.
Empirical evidence in rodents supports the hypothesis that
the hippocampus acts as an associative mismatch detector
[13–15]. In a recent study [13], neural activity in the
hippocampus was recorded in response to moving an escape
platform to a new location in a water maze. Hippocampal
novelty signals were only observed when rats had been
trained to expect the platform to be in a speciﬁc location. In
contrast, novelty signals were not observed in response to the
mere presence of associative novelty, where prior expect-
ations were absent, i.e., when the platform was moved to a
new location on each trial. This study, therefore, provides
evidence that hippocampal novelty responses speciﬁcally
reﬂect the detection of associative mismatches contingent
on the retrieval of prior expectations (i.e., ‘‘match’’), and are
not generated by the presence of associative novelty per se
when prior expectations are absent.
In humans, however, few neuroimaging experiments have
investigated hippocampal responses to associative novelty, in
which familiar items appear in novel conﬁgurations [16,17],
with the majority focussing on stimulus novelty [18–22].
Critically, these studies [16,17], although observing hippo-
campal responses to associative novelty, were not designed
with the aim of distinguishing an associative mismatch
process from a more general response to associative novelty
per se. Existing work, therefore, has not provided direct
evidence that the human hippocampus operates as an
associative mismatch detector, a process that has been
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proposed to play a cardinal role not only in novelty detection,
but also more generally in the functioning of a network
subserving memory [3,23,24]. Indeed it has been suggested by
computational models that such comparison-based compu-
tations allow mismatches between current sensory input and
stored internal representations to induce hippocampal
dynamics that favour the learning of new information (i.e.,
encoding), rather than the retrieval of old information (i.e.,
retrieval) [3,23].
In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
study, we use a repetition paradigm to characterize brain
responses to sequence novelty, in which familiar items (i.e.,
seen once previously) are viewed in a new temporal order. We
focussed on this type of (temporal) associative novelty
because theoretical models of hippocampal function have
emphasized its role in bridging discontinuities over time
[25,26], and speciﬁcally in representing episodic memories as
sequences of events [10,27–30]. Moreover, the role of the
hippocampus in novelty detection has been closely linked
with its capacity to store and recall sequences [5,10,11,29].
Indeed, the capacity to predict future events on the basis of
prior experience, and react when they do not turn out as
expected, is of clear evolutionary importance [9,10].
We therefore constructed event sequences consisting of the
consecutive presentation of four objects (i.e., a quartet),
superimposed on one of 30 background scenes to which
subjects had been pre-exposed (see Materials and Methods)
(Figure 1A and 1B). Following a short delay, the same object
quartet was re-presented in one of three possible sequential
orders (factor: sequence type, levels: Srep, Shalf, and Snew), on
either the same or a different background scene (factor:
object-context, levels: Csame and Cdifferent). In the Srep
condition, the objects were re-presented in exactly the same
order as previously (i.e., A-B-C-D; see Materials and Methods
and Figure 1), whereas in the Snew condition, the sequential
order of objects during the second presentation was entirely
different from that during the ﬁrst presentation (e.g., C-A-D-
B). In the Shalf condition, the ﬁrst half of the object sequence
was the same as during the ﬁrst presentation, but the second
half was different, with the last two items in the sequence
presented in reverse order (i.e., A-B-D-C). In common with
numerous previous studies exploring how the brain auto-
matically processes novelty regardless of its behavioral
relevance, e.g., [20,31], subjects performed an incidental task
unrelated to our experimental manipulations (1-back target
detection task; see Materials and Methods).
The design of our study, therefore, in contrast to prior
neuroimaging studies in this area [16,17], allowed us to
distinguish between an associative mismatch process and a
more general response to sequence novelty per se. As deﬁned
above and in previous work [10,14], an associative mismatch
occurs when there is a discrepancy between the stimulus that
is predicted to appear next and the stimulus that actually
appears. Associative mismatches, therefore, can be seen to be
contingent on a prior ‘‘match’’ process reﬂecting associative
retrieval of speciﬁc predictions about what will occur.
Critically, therefore, an associative mismatch situation only
arises at the third object in the Shalf condition when
predictions derived from prior experience (i.e., the ﬁrst
presentation) and cued by the ﬁrst two objects in the
sequence (i.e., match) are subsequently violated. In contrast,
a signiﬁcant associative mismatch does not occur in the Snew
condition, the condition with the greatest level of sequence
novelty (i.e., change from ﬁrst presentation). This is the case
since reordering of all aspects of the sequence, including the
salient ‘‘start’’ section, which may act as a reference point or
anchor for other elements [32], likely disrupts match
processes reﬂecting the retrieval of speciﬁc predictions
concerning which object will appear next [33,34]. Our
experimental design, therefore, was explicitly designed to
dissociate the condition with the greatest associative mis-
match (Shalf) from that containing the greatest level of
sequence novelty per se (Snew). We reasoned, therefore, that
a ﬁnding of greatest hippocampal activation in Shalf would
support the hypothesis that the hippocampus operates as an
associative mismatch detector [3,4,8–10]. Conversely, if we
observed maximal hippocampal responses to the Snew
condition, this would be consistent with a general response
to sequence novelty per se.
We, therefore, set out to characterize brain responses to
sequence novelty, a form of associative novelty not previously
explored (experiment 1). We aimed to test the hypothesis that
the human hippocampus detects associative mismatches
between what is predicted to happen based on prior
experience, and what actually occurs [3,4,8–10]. Further, in
a subsequent behavioral experiment (experiment 2), we asked
whether the violation of predictions in the Shalf condition is
associated with detectable change in subjects’ behavior using
a reaction time (RT) measure. More generally, we hoped that
determining whether the human hippocampus functions as
an associative mismatch detector during novelty detection
would provide insights into the nature of essential compu-
tations carried out by the hippocampus, processes that may
also underlie its contribution to episodic memory.
Results
Experiment 1: Neuroimaging
Behavioral data. In the incidental 1-back target detection
task performed during scanning (see Materials and Methods),
subjects detected consecutive repetitions of objects with 90%
(66%) accuracy. Average RTs for the detection of object
repeats for each sequence type, collapsed across the object-
context factor were: 522 6 22 ms (Srep), 539 6 25 ms (Shalf),
and 526 6 26 ms (Snew). There was no signiﬁcant effect of
sequence type in terms of either RT (F(2,32)¼ 0.82, p¼ 0.45) or
accuracy (F(2,32) ¼ 0.62, p ¼ 0.54). These results provide
evidence that subjects were focussed on the incidental target
detection task during the experiment, and suggest that they
attended equally to each of the three sequence types. Subjects
were thoroughly debriefed following scanning in order to
assess how they performed the task. As expected, none of the
subjects reported naming the objects to a signiﬁcant extent
or explicitly trying to memorize or retrieve the sequences of
stimuli during the experiment, conﬁrming the naturalistic
processing of object sequences (i.e., without explicit require-
ments to learn). Instead, subjects remained focussed on the
target detection task, in line with our instructions.
Neuroimaging data. We ﬁrst identiﬁed the overall pattern
of neural activity elicited by the initial viewing of sequences
of novel objects (i.e., ﬁrst presentation of the object quartet).
This was done by comparing the ﬁrst presentation of the
object quartet with the baseline condition during which
subjects viewed familiar objects always presented in the same
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sequence and in the same background scene (FIRST . BASE;
see Materials and Methods). There was signiﬁcantly greater
activation in this contrast in a distributed network previously
implicated in the processing stimulus novelty [2], including
regions such as the prefrontal cortex and notably the left
hippocampus and right entorhinal/perirhinal cortex (Figure
S1; Table S1).
Hippocampal novelty responses are maximal in the Shalf
condition. Our main interest was in determining whether
hippocampal activation in relation to novel sequential
Figure 1. Experimental Design
(A) Color pictures of objects were presented in groups of four constituting an object quartet. Objects were presented consecutively for 1 s each, with a
200-ms gap between objects, over a background scene that was displayed continuously throughout the presentation of each object quartet (first
presentation: FIRST). Subjects were pre-exposed to the set of background scenes used, prior to the scanning experiment. There followed a 2-s period
during which a fixation cross was displayed.
(B) Following this 2-s period, the same object quartet was re-presented in one of three sequence types (Srep, Shalf, or Snew) on either the same or
different background scene (Csame [as illustrated in (B)] or Cdiff) (second presentation; a 332 factorial design). The sequential order of objects during the
second presentation was A-B-C-D (Srep), A-B-D-C (Shalf), and either C-A-D-B (as illustrated) or B-D-A-C (Snew) (with the first presentation of the object
quartet denoted by A-B-C-D). Importantly, each object was trial-unique and only presented twice during the experiment (i.e., in first and second
presentations). Subjects performed an incidental 1-back target detection task throughout the experiment (see Materials and Methods).
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040424.g001
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information reﬂects either a general response to sequence
novelty, or alternatively an associative match-mismatch
process whereby initial predictions derived from prior
experience (i.e., the ﬁrst presentation) and cued by the ﬁrst
two items in the sequence (match), are subsequently violated
(associative mismatch). Accordingly, we directed our analyses
to evaluating differences in neural activity between the three
possible sequential orders (Srep, Shalf, and Snew), in which
objects could appear during the second presentation. Given
our experimental aims, the forthcoming analyses refer to
main effects of sequence type (i.e., collapsed across object-
context). Of note, there was no signiﬁcant interaction
between our experimental factors (sequence type and
object-context), even at liberal statistical thresholds (i.e., p
, 0.01 uncorrected for multiple comparisons). Moreover, no
signiﬁcant activation (i.e., at p , 0.001 uncorrected for
multiple comparisons) within predicted regions of interest
(i.e., the medial temporal lobe [MTL]) was observed when we
considered the main effects of object-context (i.e., collapsed
across sequence type). Furthermore, we did not observe any
signiﬁcant activation in other brain areas in this comparison
(p , 0.05 corrected).
We ﬁrst compared neural activity during the Shalf and Snew
conditions (Shalf . Snew). This contrast revealed signiﬁcant
activation in the body of the left hippocampus (Figure 2). No
signiﬁcant hippocampal activation was observed in the
reverse comparison (Snew . Shalf), even at liberal statistical
thresholds. Having determined that hippocampal activation
is greater in the Shalf condition as compared to the Snew
condition, we next compared the Shalf and Srep conditions
with each other. Activation in a very similar region of left
hippocampus was identiﬁed in this contrast (Shalf . Srep;
Figure 3), as well as a region of right entorhinal/perirhinal
cortex. No areas in the MTL were found to be signiﬁcantly
more active in the reverse comparison (Srep . Shalf). Hence,
these results demonstrate that a region in the left hippo-
campal body responds maximally in the Shalf condition. In
contrast, no signiﬁcant hippocampal activation was observed
when the Srep and Snew conditions were directly compared
with each other (i.e., Snew . Srep or Srep . Snew), even at
liberal statistical thresholds.
Given the Srep and Shalf conditions are indistinguishable
early on (i.e., ﬁrst two items in sequence), any signiﬁcant
differences in hippocampal activation between these two
conditions must have arisen later on in the sequence, in
particular in relation to the third item. In order to
empirically demonstrate this, we performed an additional
analysis (see Materials and Methods) in which the trial onset
was set either at the ﬁrst, or third, item in the sequence, and
neural activity was modelled with a delta/stick function. When
the trial onset was set at the third object, the pattern of
neural activations observed was highly similar to that
obtained in the ‘‘mini-block’’ analysis detailed above. As
such, signiﬁcantly greater hippocampal activation was ob-
served in the Shalf condition as compared to the Srep
condition, when the trial onset was set at the third object
(i.e., Shalf . Srep: x, y, z¼27,15,18; z¼ 3.96; Figure S2). In
marked contrast, no signiﬁcant hippocampal activation was
observed in this comparison when the trial onset was set at
the ﬁrst object, even at liberal statistical thresholds. Hence,
these results strongly suggest that the hippocampal activa-
tions in our paradigm are generated speciﬁcally in response
to later items in the Shalf condition, most likely at the third
object under conditions of associative mismatch when prior
expectations suffer violation by sensory reality.
Our results, therefore, in demonstrating that hippocampal
activation is maximal in the Shalf condition, go clearly against
the notion that the hippocampus responds to sequence
novelty per se. Instead, our ﬁndings suggest that in the Shalf
condition, expectations initially set in train (match) are
subsequently violated (associative mismatch) at the third
object in the sequence, resulting in the generation of a
Figure 2. Main Effect of Sequence Type in Left Hippocampus: Shalf .
Snew
Results of comparison of Shalf and Snew conditions (Shalf. Snew, collapsed
across object-context factor). ‘‘Glass brain’’ figures are displayed above.
Activations shown on the averaged structural MRI scan of the 17
participants (displayed below). The color bar indicates the t-statistic
associated with each voxel, and the Z-score equivalent. Activation in left
hippocampus (HC) (x, y, z¼27,18,18; z¼ 3.59) is circled in sagittal,
coronal, and axial planes. Activation in left medial prefrontal cortex (x, y, z
¼9, 36, 15; z ¼ 3.58) evident on axial section and significant at p ,
0.001 uncorrected. Threshold is set at p , 0.005 uncorrected for display
purposes.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040424.g002
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mismatch (or novelty) signal within the hippocampus. Thus,
the pattern of hippocampal activation during viewing of
novel sequential information would seem to be best charac-
terized by an associative match-mismatch process, providing
compelling support for computational models in which this
putative neural mechanism plays a key role in novelty
detection [3,4,8–10].
Right entorhinal/perirhinal cortex exhibits novelty re-
sponses in both conditions in which sequence novelty is
present (Shalf and Snew). The pattern of activation observed in
the right entorhinal/perirhinal cortex (hereafter referred to
as right entorhinal cortex) in relation to the three sequence
conditions was qualitatively different from that observed in
the hippocampus. Although signiﬁcantly greater activation
was observed in this area in the Shalf condition as compared
to the Srep condition (Shalf . Srep; Figure 3), no signiﬁcant
activation was found when the Shalf condition was compared
to the Snew condition (i.e., Shalf . Snew or Snew . Shalf). That
the right entorhinal cortex responds more generally to
sequence novelty per se is supported by the signiﬁcantly
greater activation in this region observed when we consid-
ered the main effect of sequence change (i.e., Shalf þ Snew .
Srep; Figure 4). Notably, no hippocampal activation was
observed in this comparison. As such, the entorhinal cortex,
but not the hippocampus, exhibited differential responses
during the second presentation to both conditions in which
sequence novelty was present (Shalf and Snew). Therefore, our
results suggest that whereas the pattern of hippocampal
activation in relation to the three sequence types is consistent
with the operation of associative match-mismatch processes,
the pattern observed in the entorhinal cortex is instead better
characterized by a more general response to sequence novelty
per se.
Experiment 2: Behavioral
Our neuroimaging results demonstrate that greatest hippo-
campal activation occurs under conditions of associative
mismatch (i.e., the Shalf condition), when expectations initially
set in train (match) are subsequently violated (associative
mismatch). We next asked whether predictions generated on
the basis of previous experience (i.e., ﬁrst presentation), and
subsequently violated at the third object in the Shalf
condition, are associated with a detectable change in subjects’
behavior (i.e., using an RT measure as an index of behavior
during the second presentation). During the scanning experi-
ment, subjects performed an incidental task (i.e., 1-back
target detection; see Materials and Methods) so as to avoid
contaminating the brain activation data with the inﬂuence of
frequent motor responses. In the behavioral experiment,
however, a group of naive subjects performed a speeded
semantic categorisation task on each object presented (see
Materials and Methods), chosen in order to avoid any explicit
requirements to learn, and thus preserve the naturalistic
processing of event sequences.
As in the neuroimaging study, our analyses were directed to
evaluating differences in RT between the three sequence
types comprising the second presentation (Srep, Shalf, and
Snew). Subjects made few errors throughout the experiment
(average performance: 96.8 % 6 1.1 % correct responses)
with no signiﬁcant differences in number of errors between
sequence types: Srep (5.6 6 3.0), Shalf (6.8 6 2.3), and Snew (5.6
6 3.0): F(2,14) ¼ 1.0, p ¼ 0.4). As we expected, there was a
signiﬁcant main effect of sequence type on RT (two way
analysis of variance [ANOVA]; factors: sequence type and
item position: F(2,14)¼7.7, p, 0.01) with subjects fastest in the
Srep condition (mean 573 msec) and slowest in the Snew
condition (mean 598 msec), providing behavioral evidence of
the utility of prior predictions in the Srep sequence (Figure 5).
There was also a signiﬁcant interaction between sequence
type and item position (F(6,42) ¼ 2.8, p , 0.05). Crucially, this
effect was revealed by a subsequent ANOVA to be due to a
signiﬁcant RT cost when initial predictions in the Shalf
condition were violated at the third position in the sequence,
Figure 3. Main Effect of Sequence Type in Left Hippocampus and Right
Entorhinal/Perirhinal Cortex: Shalf . Srep
Results of comparison of Shalf and Srep conditions (Shalf . Srep, collapsed
across object-context factor). ‘‘Glass brain’’ figures are displayed above.
Activations shown on the averaged structural MRI scan of the 17
participants (displayed below). The color bar indicates the t-statistic
associated with each voxel and the Z-score equivalent. Activation in left
hippocampus (HC) (x, y, z ¼27, 15, 18; z ¼ 3.51) evident in sagittal
and coronal sections. Activation in right entorhinal/perirhinal (ERC) (x, y, z
¼21,9,30; z¼4.07) evident on coronal and axial sections. Threshold is
set at p , 0.005 uncorrected for display purposes.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040424.g003
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as evidenced by a signiﬁcant interaction between item
position (second and third) and sequence type (Shalf and
Snew: F(1,7) ¼ 17.0, p , 0.01; Figure 5). A two-tailed t-test also
conﬁrmed that subjects were signiﬁcantly slower at the third
position in the Shalf condition as compared to the Snew
condition (t(7) ¼ 3.5, p , 0.01). These results, therefore,
provide compelling evidence that sequential predictions
generated on the basis of a single prior experience
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence subjects’ subsequent behavior, most
strikingly manifesting as a marked RT cost in the Shalf
condition when expectations conﬂict with current experi-
ence.
Discussion
We used functional neuroimaging to test the hypothesis
that the human hippocampus acts as an associative mismatch
detector during the processing of novel sequential informa-
tion, a form of associative novelty not previously studied.
Hippocampal activation was observed to be maximal in the
Shalf condition, where predictions concerning which object
will appear next in the sequence are violated by sensory
reality. In contrast, the pattern of activation exhibited by the
entorhinal cortex suggested a general response to sequence
novelty per se. Further, the results of a separate behavioral
experiment demonstrated that the presence of associative
mismatch speciﬁcally at the third object in the Shalf condition
results in a substantial RT cost, providing evidence of the
signiﬁcant inﬂuence of prior expectations, and their viola-
tion, on current behavior. The present study, therefore,
provides empirical support for theoretical models in which
associative match-mismatch processing constitutes a cardinal
mechanism underpinning the hippocampal contribution to
novelty detection. More generally, our results also offer
insights into the nature of fundamental computations carried
out by the hippocampus, which may also underlie its unique
contribution to episodic memory.
We observed that hippocampal activation was maximal in
the Shalf condition, in which the ﬁrst half of the sequence (i.e.,
ﬁrst two items) was repeated and the second half novel. This
ﬁnding argues strongly against a hippocampal response to
sequence novelty per se, which would predict maximal
responses in the Snew condition. Instead, our ﬁndings are
consistent with theoretical frameworks in which the hippo-
campus is viewed to operate as an associative mismatch
detector during novelty detection [3,4,8,9], and in particular
during the processing of sequence novelty [5,10,11]. Accord-
ing to this recently proposed computational model [5,10,11],
a sensory cue (i.e., the ﬁrst object in the sequence) triggers
autoassociative recall of the entire stored sequence within the
CA3 region of the hippocampus. The readout of sequential
information is said to be time compressed because it is played
out at a rate more rapid that the actual occurrence of events
[10]. This process results in the output of sequential
predictions to the CA1 region allowing the organism to
anticipate what will happen next based on previous experi-
ence. The CA1 region is proposed to act as an associative
match-mismatch processor, whereby predictions arriving
from CA3 are compared with the sensory reality arriving
directly from the entorhinal cortex [10]. Hippocampal
novelty signals, therefore, are viewed to occur speciﬁcally in
response to an associative mismatch situation, i.e., when there
is a discrepancy between the stimulus that is predicted to
appear next in the sequence, and the stimulus that actually
appears. This situation only occurs in the Shalf condition, and
not in the other two sequence conditions in which predic-
tions about which object would appear next were either
conﬁrmed at each stage (Srep), or likely never set in motion
due to reordering of the entire sequence (Snew) [33]. Results of
the behavioral experiment provided evidence that predic-
tions concerning which object would appear next, derived
from a single prior experience (i.e., ﬁrst presentation)
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced subjects’ behavior in our paradigm
(i.e., during the second presentation). Critically, subjects’ RT
increased signiﬁcantly between the second and third objects
Figure 4. Main Effect of Sequence Type in Right Entorhinal/Perirhinal
Cortex: Shalf þ Snew . Srep
Significantly greater activation observed in right entorhinal/perirhinal
cortex (ERC) in comparison of Shalf and Snew conditions against Srep
condition (Shalf þ Snew . Srep, collapsed across object-context factor).
‘‘Glass brain’’ figures are displayed above. Activations shown on the
averaged structural MRI scan of the 17 participants (displayed below).
The color bar indicates the t-statistic associated with each voxel, and the
Z-score equivalent. Activation in right entorhinal/perirhinal cortex (x, y, z
¼ 21, 6, 30; z ¼ 3.56) circled in sagittal, coronal, and axial planes.
Threshold is set at p , 0.005 uncorrected for display purposes.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040424.g004
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in the Shalf condition, in the presence of an associative
mismatch between prior expectations and impinging reality.
As such, our results accord well with previous studies
demonstrating the substantial RT cost when expectations
are violated [35]. In contrast, no such acute slowing of
subjects’ RT (i.e., increase in RT between successive items in
the sequence) was observed at any stage in the Snew condition,
providing further conﬁrmation that a signiﬁcant associative
mismatch situation does not arise in this condition. The
present study, therefore, provides empirical support that the
human hippocampus, like its rodent counterpart [13,14], does
indeed detect associative mismatches in the environment, a
process that signiﬁcantly inﬂuences subsequent behavior and
is widely held to play a critical role in novelty detection.
The entorhinal/perirhinal cortex, in contrast, was observed
to respond to both conditions in which sequence novelty was
present (Shalf and Snew), as compared to the condition in
which sequential information was repeated (Srep). This
pattern of activation, which is consistent with a general
response to sequence novelty per se, may reﬂect the
phenomenon of repetition suppression [1,2,36]. Repetition
suppression refers to the reduced neural activity elicited by
familiar, as compared to novel stimuli or stimulus conﬁg-
urations. Indeed, activation in a region of the right MTL close
to that identiﬁed in our study (in response to sequence
novelty) has been previously reported in relation to stimulus
novelty [37]. Repetition suppression may be mediated by the
tuning of neural representations, such that familiar stimuli
tend to activate fewer neurons and therefore evoke less
neural activity [1,36]. Although, the phenomenon of repeti-
tion suppression has been predominantly studied in relation
to the coding of stimulus novelty [1,36], similar mechanisms
have also been suggested to underlie the processing of
associative novelty [1,38–40]. In this fashion, therefore, the
entorhinal cortex may exhibit a more general response to
sequence novelty, in contrast to the computationally reﬁned
associative match-mismatch processes operating within the
hippocampus.
Our ﬁndings, therefore, in demonstrating that sequence
novelty responses occur in both the hippocampus and the
entorhinal cortex, accord with the view that the processing of
associative information occurs in different areas of the MTL,
and not solely the hippocampus [41,42]. However, our results
suggest that functional specialisation within the MTL may
exist along other lines, given the qualitatively different
pattern of activation in relation to the three sequence types
observed in the hippocampus, as compared to the entorhinal
cortex. The hippocampus alone was found to operate as an
associative mismatch detector, a process that is thought to
rely upon both comparison-based and autoassociative com-
putations [3,10]. As such, our results support the hypothesis
that a key aspect of the hippocampal contribution to memory
may perhaps be a unique ability to retrieve, through the
process of pattern completion, the entire previously stored
pattern from a partial input cue (e.g., ﬁrst item in a sequence)
[10,43–45]. In this way, the hippocampus may make a speciﬁc
contribution, as distinct from other areas in the MTL, to the
process of recollecting additional contextual details relating
to an episode, and more generally to autobiographical
memory [1,29].
We considered the possibility that encoding-related pro-
cesses, as opposed to those involved in novelty detection, may
contribute to the observed activations within the MTL.
Indeed, it is widely accepted that events judged to be novel
are afforded preferential status in terms of subsequent
encoding into memory [2,18]. However, it would seem highly
unlikely that the observed activations within the hippo-
campus reﬂect primarily encoding-related processes, rather
than associative mismatch computations. First, the hippo-
campus was the only region in the brain found to exhibit a
pattern of neural activity consistent with that of an
associative mismatch detector. Hence, it is difﬁcult to argue
that a different brain region is responsible for initially
detecting associative mismatches in the Shalf condition, with
the hippocampus merely engaged at a later stage (i.e., during
subsequent encoding). Second, we observed a qualitatively
different pattern of activity in relation to the three sequence
types in the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex. This ﬁnding
strongly suggests that these two MTL regions perform
different computations during novelty detection, rather than
merely participating in the encoding of novel information.
Hence, although the engagement of encoding-related pro-
cesses may naturally follow the detection of associative
mismatch by the hippocampus, our results provide support
for the theoretical validity [11] of distinguishing between
these two processes and their underlying mechanisms.
Interestingly, our paradigm shares some similarities with a
task that has been widely used in both animals and humans
[29,46,47]. In this delayed non-matching to sample (DNMS)
task, subjects must remember either a sample stimulus (e.g.,
single object: ‘‘item DNMS task’’) or stimulus conjunction
Figure 5. Results of Experiment 2 (Behavioral): RT Cost of the Violation of
Prior Expectations in the Shalf Condition
During this experiment, a separate group of naive subjects performed a
speeded semantic categorization task (see Materials and Methods). There
was a significant effect of sequence type (i.e., collapsed across item
position), with subjects fastest in the Srep condition (black diamonds),
reflecting the utility of sequential predictions based on a single prior
experience (i.e., first presentation: see Results for details). Critically, a
significant RT cost was observed in the Shalf condition (red squares) at
thethird item position, when prior predictions are violated by sensory
reality. Note, no error bars are displayed because reported statistical
comparisons reflect within-subject effects (as opposed to the condition-
specific between-subject variance measure represented by bars). Green
triangles indicate Snew condition.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040424.g005
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(e.g., object-location: ‘‘associative DNMS task’’) across a
variable delay period in order to select the correct stimulus
(or stimulus-conjunction) at test. It is important to note,
however, that in our paradigm, subjects performed an
incidental target detection task so as to emphasize the
naturalistic processing of object sequences and avoid any
explicit requirements to make old or new judgements. As
such, subjects were not required to, and reported that they
did not, actively maintain sequential information across the
delay period. There is considerable evidence that MTL lesions
produce deﬁcits in the DNMS task when sample stimuli are
trial-unique (i.e., where no prior representations exist within
the brain) even at delays of no more than a few seconds (e.g.,
between 6–8 s in references [48–50]). Of note, the effective
delay in our paradigm was in the region of 10 s (i.e., time
interval between the start of the ﬁrst presentation and the
critical third object in the second presentation), with several
intervening objects presented during this time window. That
selective hippocampal lesions only inconsistently produce
impairments on the item-based DNMS task, but appear to
produce deﬁcits on associative DNMS tasks [50], has been
suggested to reﬂect the primary role of the hippocampus in
recollective or associative, as opposed to single-item recog-
nition-related processes [29]. Our results, therefore, are
consistent with convergent evidence that the MTL is critical
for rapidly forming neural representations of novel trial-
unique stimuli (i.e., as used in our experiment), which are
accessible at test, and therefore support successful perform-
ance on the DNMS task [46,49,51].
The present results, therefore, suggest that the hippo-
campus acts as an associative mismatch detector, identifying
when speciﬁc predictions based on ‘‘one-shot’’ sequential
experiences are violated by impinging sensory reality. In
contrast, other brain regions (e.g., striatum and prefrontal
cortex) are widely held to detect expectancy violations under
different circumstances, where learning occurs over repeated
instances and is thought to be instantiated by prediction
error–type signals [52–54]. The hippocampus, therefore,
drawing on its putative capacity for the formation of one-
shot associative representations [29,43,44,55], may play a
speciﬁc role in predicting future events on the basis of a
single prior episode (i.e., sequence of events). There is also
evidence that the hippocampus plays a wide role in the
detection of novel events that are unexpected given the
general context of the experiment [6,31,56], rather than
because they violate speciﬁc associatively retrieved predic-
tions (i.e., as in our experiment). For example, the hippo-
campus appears to respond to infrequently presented oddball
stimuli occurring against a background of repetitively
presented stimuli, although the magnitude of this response
appears to decrease over the course of the experiment
[6,31,57]. It has therefore been suggested that the hippo-
campus may represent the statistical likelihood of expected
outcomes in a given setting [35,58,59]. It should, however, be
noted that hippocampal lesions appear not to affect the
mismatch negativity (MMN) component of the event-related
potential (ERP), a ﬁnding that has been attributed to the
simple nature of the stimuli employed in such auditory
paradigms [60]. The present study provides evidence that the
hippocampus plays a speciﬁc role in detecting violations of
predictions formed on the basis of a single sequential
experience. Our results, therefore, accord with a wider role
for the hippocampus in the detection of unpredictable
events, through its ability to act as a comparator between
past and present experience, although future studies are
required to establish the range of circumstances under which
this process occurs.
In conclusion, the present study establishes the biological
reality of associative match-mismatch computations within
the human hippocampus, a process that has been widely held
to play a cardinal role, not only during novelty detection, but
also in determining the appropriate operating mode of a
network subserving memory (i.e., encoding vs. retrieval). Our
results also suggest that the hippocampus may play an
important role in predicting on the basis of a single prior
experience how future events will unfold, and critically in
detecting when violations of these expectancies occur. In the
future, it will be of considerable importance to establish the
range of situations in which the human hippocampus
performs associative match-mismatch computations, and in
particular whether these computations also operate during
the processing of other types (e.g., spatial) of associative
novelty.
Materials and Methods
Experiment 1: Neuroimaging. Subjects: Seventeen healthy, right-
handed native English speakers, who were currently undertaking or
had recently completed a university degree, participated in this
experiment (age range 18–32 y, average age 26 y; nine female). All
subjects were free from neurological and psychiatric disease and gave
informed written consent to participate in accordance with the local
research ethics committee.
Stimuli: Approximately one thousand color pictures of objects
were used in this study. Pictures of objects were obtained from the
Hemera Photo-Objects image collection (http://www.hemera.com/)
and included pictures of household objects, animals, and cars, but no
faces. Objects were placed on a white background. There was an
approximately equal balance of animate and inanimate objects in the
main experimental conditions. In addition, the allocation of stimuli
was randomized between subjects and experimental conditions.
Examples of objects used in the experiment are shown in Figure 1.
Thirty-one pictures of background scenes were used in this study.
They consisted of outdoor scenes (e.g., beach or mountains) and were
obtained from the Hemera Photo-Objects image collection and a
variety of other sources on the Internet. In order to minimize
possible effects of scene novelty, subjects were pre-exposed to all
background scenes prior to the scanning experiment, viewing each
three times while performing an incidental task (i.e., rating the
aesthetic appeal of the pictures). The allocation of stimuli was also
randomized between subjects with each scene appearing approx-
imately equally frequently in each of the experimental conditions. An
example of a background scene used in the experiment is shown in
Figure 1.
Experimental task and procedures: The four objects in each
quartet were presented consecutively for 1 s each (ﬁrst presentation;
FIRST) with a 200-ms inter-stimulus gap. Each object within a quartet
was presented centrally over a background scene, which was displayed
continuously throughout the presentation of each object quartet.
Following the display of a central ﬁxation cross (2-s duration), the
same object quartet was re-presented (second presentation), on either
the same or different background scene (Csame or Cdiff) in one of
three sequence types (Srep, Shalf, or Snew). Thus, the design of our
experiment was 33 2 factorial (with 25 trials of each condition) with
factors: sequence type and object-context.
Importantly, each object was trial-unique, only appearing twice in
total (i.e., in ﬁrst and second presentations). The sequential order of
objects during the second presentation was A-B-C-D (Srep), A-B-D-C
(Shalf), and C-A-D-B or B-D-A-C (Snew) (with the ﬁrst presentation of
the object quartet denoted by A-B-C-D). The two possible orders for
the Snew condition were selected so as to ensure all objects occupied a
different ordinal position in the second presentation, with no
forward (or backward) sequential associations preserved between
ﬁrst and second presentations. There was also a baseline condition
(BASE; 25 trials) in which one object quartet was repeatedly
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presented with objects always in the same sequence and on the same
background context. Subjects were pre-exposed to this quartet in a
prescan training session, rendering objects, sequence, and back-
ground context entirely familiar in this condition. The order in which
each experimental condition was presented was randomized with the
constraint that a given condition did not occur more than two times
consecutively.
Prior to scanning, subjects were informed that they would be
participating in a speed target-detection task. Our choice of task
reﬂected the desire to emphasize the naturalistic processing of object
sequences (i.e., without explicit requirements to learn), while
ensuring that subjects attended to the objects themselves. Subjects
were instructed to respond with a key press if the same object
repeated twice in a row (1-back task). There was no task related to the
background scene, in line with the notion that in the real world,
context forms the backdrop in which events occur. In order to
encourage the processing of object quartets as individual ‘‘episodes,’’
subjects were told that they should only look out for two-in-a-row
object repeats within (and not between) object quartets. Thus,
although subjects were aware prior to scanning that objects would
be presented in groups of four, they were not informed of our
experimental manipulations. Subjects were warned that we would be
monitoring their reaction times and thus were encouraged to stay
alert throughout in order to respond to a repeat (i.e., target) as fast as
possible, without compromising accuracy. Over the course of the
entire experiment, there were 51 trials in which targets (i.e., two-in-a-
row object repeats) were present, requiring subjects to respond with a
key press. These trials were excluded from the main analyses. Target
trials were equally distributed between all experimental conditions
(including the baseline condition), such that the probability of a
target occurring was constant across ﬁrst and second presentations of
object quartets.
After scanning, subjects participated in a debrieﬁng session in
which they were asked in general about how they performed the task,
and any strategies they might have used.
fMRI design: The temporal pattern of stimulus presentation was
designed to maximise statistical efﬁciency while preserving psycho-
logical validity, in line with established procedures [61–63]. The trial
onset asynchrony (TOA) is not a simple integer multiple of the
repetition time, TR (time for acquisition of one scanning volume ¼
4.05 s) [61]. Importantly, the haemodynamic response to events that
occur a few seconds apart is explicitly modelled (via a haemodynamic
response function [HRF]), and therefore can be estimated separately
for each event type by implementing the general linear model as is
standard when using statistical parametric mapping software (SPM2)
(http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) (also see below) [62].
Imaging parameters and acquisition: T2*-weighted echo planar
(EPI) images with BOLD (blood oxygen level–dependent) contrast
were acquired (268 volumes/session; three scanning sessions) on a 1.5
tesla Siemens Sonata MRI scanner (Siemens plc, Erlangen, Germany)
using a specialized sequence to minimize signal dropout in the MTL
[64]. We used the following scanning parameters to achieve whole
brain coverage: 45 oblique axial slices angled at 308 in the anterior-
posterior axis, TR 4.05 s, 2-mm thickness (1-mm gap), echo time (TE)
30 ms, in-plane resolution 33 3 mm, ﬁeld-of-view 192 mm, 643 64
matrix. A preparation pulse (duration 1 ms, amplitudeþ 1 mT/m*ms)
was used in the slice selection direction to compensate for through-
plane susceptibility gradients predominant in the hippocampus [65].
High-resolution (13131 mm) T1-weighted structural MRI scan were
acquired for each subject after functional scanning. These were co-
registered to the functional EPIs, and averaged across subjects to aid
localization.
fMRI data preprocessing (SPM2): Images were analyzed in a
standard manner using the statistical parametric mapping software
SPM2 (http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). After the ﬁrst six ‘‘dummy
volumes’’ were discarded to permit T1 relaxation, images were
spatially realigned to the ﬁrst volume of the ﬁrst session, followed by
spatial normalization to a standard EPI template, resulting in a
functional voxel size of 3 3 3 3 3 mm. Normalized images were
smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with full width at half maximum of
8 mm.
fMRI data analysis (SPM2): Following preprocessing, the event-
related fMRI data were analyzed in SPM2 using the general linear
model (GLM) using established procedures [61,62]. As a ﬁrst step,
vectors corresponding to the onset times for each of the condition
types were created. Our main interest was in the 4.8-s period during
which the object quartet was presented. Therefore these vectors were
then coded as boxcar functions (of 4.8-s duration) constituting
regressors of interest in the GLM (i.e., the ﬁrst-level design matrix).
These regressors were then convolved with the canonical HRF. One
regressor of no interest was also included coding for target trials. In
addition, subject-speciﬁc movement parameters (derived from
realignment) were included as regressors of no interest. A high-pass
ﬁlter with a cutoff of 128 s was employed to remove low-frequency
drifts. Temporal autocorrelation was modelled using an AR(1)
process.
Model estimation proceeded in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage,
condition-speciﬁc experimental effects (parameter estimates, or
regression coefﬁcients, pertaining to the height of the canonical
HRF) were obtained via the GLM in a voxel-wise manner for each
subject. In the second (random-effects) stage, subject-speciﬁc linear
contrasts of these parameter estimates, collapsed across the three
sessions, were entered into a series of one-sample t-tests (as is
standard when using statistical parametric mapping [SPM] and a
factorial design [61]), each constituting a group-level statistical
parametric map. Condition-speciﬁc percentage signal changes were
calculated using the MarsBar SPM toolbox (http://marsbar.
sourceforge.net/).
Given our clear a priori anatomical hypotheses, we report
activations within the MTL at p , 0.001 uncorrected for multiple
comparisons, with an extent threshold of more than ﬁve contiguous
voxels. Hippocampal activations survived small volume correction
(SVC), performed using an anatomical mask drawn around the left
hippocampus on the average structural MR image for all participants.
The SVC procedure, as implemented in SPM2 using the family-wise
error (FWE) correction (p , 0.05), allows results to be corrected for
multiple non-independent comparisons with a deﬁned region of
interest, in this case the left hippocampus. Activations in other brain
regions are reported for completeness at a threshold of p , 0.001
uncorrected for multiple comparisons, but were only considered
signiﬁcant if they survive whole brain correction for multiple
comparisons at p , 0.05 (in line with established procedures [61]).
All activations are displayed on sections of the average structural
image of all the participants. Reported voxels conform to MNI
(Montreal Neurological Institute) coordinate space. Right side of the
brain is displayed on the right side.
We also performed two additional event-related analyses: in one
analysis, the trial onset for each condition was set at the critical third
object in each quartet, and in the other, the trial onset was set at the
ﬁrst object in the quartet. As in the primary analysis detailed above,
vectors corresponding to the onset times for each of the condition
types were created. These vectors were then coded as delta (i.e., stick)
functions constituting regressors of interest in the GLM (i.e., the ﬁrst-
level design matrix). Next, these regressors were convolved with the
canonical HRF [62]. One regressor of no interest was also included
coding for target trials. In addition, subject-speciﬁc movement
parameters (derived from realignment) were included as regressors
of no interest. A high-pass ﬁlter with a cutoff of 128 s was employed
to remove low-frequency drifts. Temporal autocorrelation was
modelled using an AR(1) process. Further analysis proceeded in the
same way as the primary analysis.
Experiment 2: Behavioral subjects: This experiment was conducted
in a separate group of naive subjects (n ¼ 8; average age 27 y; three
female) to ask whether predictions generated on the basis of previous
experience (i.e., ﬁrst presentation), and subsequently violated in the
Shalf condition, are associated with a detectable change in subjects’
subsequent behavior (i.e., using an RT measure as an index of
behavior during the second presentation). All subjects were free from
neurological and psychiatric disease and gave informed written
consent to participate in accordance with the local research ethics
committee.
Stimuli, experimental design, and procedures: A different set of
540 color pictures of objects also obtained from the Hemera Photo-
Objects image collection (http://www.hemera.com/) were used in this
experiment, divided into an equal number of four semantic
categories (animals, food, manmade objects, and vehicles). Objects
were placed on a white background. Given the aim of this behavioral
study and our neuroimaging results, no background scenes were used
in this experiment. Objects were presented in 135 quartets in total, in
the three experimental conditions (Srep, Shalf, and Snew: 45 trials of
each). The allocation of stimuli was randomized between subjects and
experimental conditions.
In line with the results of a pilot behavioral study, the timings of
object presentation were slightly changed from that of the neuro-
imaging study, in order to afford subjects adequate time to perform
the semantic categorization task. As such, the four objects in each
quartet were presented centrally for 1.5 s each (i.e., ﬁrst presenta-
tion). As in the neuroimaging experiment, following the display of a
central ﬁxation cross (2-s duration), the same object quartet was re-
presented (second presentation) in one of three sequence types (Srep,
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Shalf, or Snew). Of note, the presentation of stimuli was constrained
such that two objects in the same semantic category would not appear
consecutively. This was done in order to avoid possible effects on the
RT of consecutive responses using the same key. However, it was
permitted that two objects in a given semantic category could appear
in each quartet.
During the scanning experiment, subjects performed an incidental
task (i.e., 1-back target detection) so as to avoid contaminating the
brain activation data with the inﬂuence of frequent motor responses.
In this experiment, however, subjects performed a speeded semantic
categorisation task on each object presented, entering their response
using four keys on a standard keyboard. This task was chosen in order
to avoid any explicit requirements to learn, and thus preserve the
naturalistic processing of event sequences. Subjects were warned that
we would be monitoring their reaction times and thus encouraged to
respond as fast as possible, without compromising accuracy. Prior to
the actual experiment, subjects were instructed as to which key
mapped to a given semantic category and received practice to
familiarize themselves with the task (i.e., 25 trials, approximately 7
min). The mapping of keys to semantic categories was the same in all
subjects. The experiment was divided into ﬁve runs lasting
approximately 8 min each, with a 1-min break in between each run.
Following the completion of the experiment, subjects were debriefed
in exactly the same way as described previously. As expected, none of
the subjects reported actively maintaining sequential information
across the delay period, instead remaining focused on the semantic
categorization task.
Analysis: As in the neuroimaging study, our analyses were directed
to evaluating differences in RT between the three sequence types
comprising the second presentation (Srep, Shalf, and Snew). Addition-
ally, RTs were separated according to position in the sequence (e.g.,
third item in object quartet) in order to allow us to examine the RT
cost of violation of prior predictions in the Shalf condition at the third
item in the sequence. Analysis was conducted using SPSS software
(http://www.spss.com/index.htm). Data were entered into a 3 (se-
quence type) 3 4 (item position) ANOVA. Further, ANOVAs were
conducted in order to examine effects speciﬁc to particular sequence
types and item positions (see Results for details). Effects are reported
as signiﬁcant at p , 0.05.
Supporting Information
Figure S1. Brain Areas Signiﬁcantly More Active during First
Presentation as Compared to Baseline Condition: FIRST . BASE
Signiﬁcantly greater activation observed in this comparison (FIRST.
BASE) in a distributed network of brain regions, including left
hippocampus (x, y, z ¼ 24, 24, 15; z ¼ 3.79), right entorhinal/
perirhinal cortex (x, y, z ¼ 21, -12, 27; z ¼ 4.96), left medial
prefrontal cortex (x, y, z¼3, 36,6; z¼ 4.07), and visual cortex (see
Table S1). During the baseline condition, one object quartet was
repeatedly presented with objects always in the same sequence and on
the same background context (see Materials and Methods). Subjects
were pre-exposed to this quartet in a prescan training session,
rendering objects, sequence, and background context entirely
familiar in this condition. ‘‘Glass brain’’ ﬁgures are displayed above.
Activations shown on the averaged structural MRI scan of the 17
participants (displayed below). The color bar indicates the t-statistic
associated with each voxel and the Z-score equivalent. Threshold is
set at p , 0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons.
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040424.sg001 (3.5 MB TIF).
Figure S2. Event-Related Analysis with Trial Onset Set at Critical
Third Object: Main Effect of Sequence Type (Shalf . Srep)
Results of comparison of Shalf and Srep conditions (Shalf . Srep,
collapsed across object-context factor) in analysis in which trial onset
was set at the critical third object in the sequence in which an
associative mismatch occurs in the Shalf condition (see Materials and
Methods). ‘‘Glass brain’’ ﬁgures are displayed above. Activations
shown on the averaged structural MRI scan of the 17 participants
(displayed below). R, right side of the brain. The color bar indicates
the t-statistic associated with each voxel and the Z-score equivalent.
Activation in left hippocampus (x, y, z¼27,15,18; z¼3.96) evident
in sagittal and coronal sections. Activation in right entorhinal/
perirhinal (x, y, z ¼ 21, 9, 30; z ¼ 3.94) also evident on coronal and
axial sections. Threshold is set at p , 0.005 uncorrected for display
purposes.
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040424.sg002 (2.8 MB TIF).
Table S1. Brain Areas Signiﬁcantly More Active during First
Presentation as Compared to Baseline Condition: FIRST . BASE
All values, p , 0.001 uncorrected.
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040424.st001 (25 KB DOC).
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